Start at the bottom for maximum effect...
Unbelievable!
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From: Sima, Caleb
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2009 4:33 PM
To: Hoffman, Billy; QM Security-Labs
Subject: RE: 1995 calledA rush of nostalgia! A PHF in the wild.
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From: Sullo, Christopher
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2009 4:32 PM
To: Hoffman, Billy; QM Security-Labs
Subject: RE: 1995 calledYou see 'tproot'?
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From: Hoffman, Billy
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2009 4:30 PM
To: Hoffman, Billy; Sullo, Christopher; QM Security-Labs
Subject: 1995 called>
[image of using PHF to dump the code of PHF]
Now behold the power of PHFF
_____________________________________________
From: Hoffman, Billy
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2009 4:28 PM
To: Sullo, Christopher; QM Security-Labs
Subject: RE: 1997 called...Pretty sure the extra "F" stands for fucked
Billy Hoffman
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Manager, HP Web Security Research Group
HP Software – Application Security Center
Direct: 770-343-7069_____________________________________________
From: Sullo, Christopher
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2009 4:25 PM
To: Hoffman, Billy; QM Security-Labs
Subject: RE: 1997 called...I didn't even notice 'phff' in the list...
extra f doesn't seem to stop the exploit from working though... :-)
http://XXXX/cgi-bin/phff
_____________________________________________
From: Hoffman, Billy
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2009 4:18 PM
To: Sullo, Christopher; QM Security-Labs
Subject: RE: 1997 called...If only 1995 had called and given us the /cgi-bin/phf vuln. Guess we have to stick with finger.
Billy Hoffman
--
Manager, HP Web Security Research Group
HP Software – Application Security Center
Direct: 770-343-7069_____________________________________________
From: Sullo, Christopher
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2009 4:16 PM
To: QM Security-Labs
Subject: 1997 called...Trying to benchmark against small-ish sites… since this one has little content I thought it'd be a good candidate, but it seems to have every ancient and horridly vulnerable script installed
http://XXXXX/cgi-bin/nph-test-cgi?*
The list of CGIs from that dir listing request. … those in red have known LFI/exec vulns based on the partial scan I just paused:
addpass.pl adjuggler.cgi ajconfig allform animation archie begin.gif calendar cards.pl cardsa.pl ccmerchant.pl ccmerchant2.pl ccmerchant2.pl.old ccship.pl counter.pl cybercart.pl date discus donothing english.pl finger formmail.pl formmail.pl.1.92 formmail.pl.old.pre.verio.chris fortune ftpdiag.cgi getorder.pl guestbook.pl imagemap jj last.gif links.pl mail nph-animate nph-error.pl nph-test-cgi phff popconfig.pl popform.pl post-query postlogo.gif printenv query rand_image.pl rand_image2.pl rand_text.pl redirect smpro ssis subscribeme summary.pl test-cgi test-cgi.tcl test-cgii test-env uptime wais.pl wwwboard.pl
What's funny (sort of) is that I was thinking there may be old/random tests that we could remove from Standard policy to get some performance gain, but this just made me question that line of thinking… clearly not an ecommerce or bank site, but that magazine is available in every grocery store and random place I walk into.
_________________
Research Engineer
HP Web Security Research Group
804-419-4184
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